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Once again, the World has been faced with an oil price shock as a result of the  
SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus pandemic. This has resurrected an old debate of whether retail fuel 
prices adjust significantly to either increases or decreases in international crude oil prices.  
With many countries moving towards the deregulation of their petroleum sub-sector, the impact of 
the US dollar exchange rate on retail fuel prices cannot be overlooked. 
This study investigates the rate at which positive and negative changes in international  
Brent crude oil prices and the US dollar exchange rate affected the increases or decreases in the ex-
pump price of premium gasoline between February 2012 and December 2019. Using a non-linear 
auto-regressive distributed lag model, the exchange rate was found to play a significant role in 
fluctuations in the retail price of premium gasoline in Ghana and Colombia in the long run, howev-
er, the rate of adjustment between the negative and positive changes was not significant, dispelling 
the perception of price asymmetry. There was no significant relationship between the ex-pump 
price of premium gasoline and the international Brent crude oil price in Ghana and Kenya in the 
long run. This study recommends that the aforementioned countries prioritise the creation of ex-
change rate buffers to prevent exchange rate shocks that may affect retail fuel prices.  
 
KEYWORDS: asymmetry, government policy, exchange rate 
Demand for oil has all but dried up as lockdowns, due to the SARS-CoV-2 
coronavirus pandemic, across the World have brought economic activities to their 
lowest point in recent times. The oil industry has been struggling with this tumbling 
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demand and infighting among producers about the reduction of output. This phe-
nomenon, sharp increases or decreases, has been re-occurring over the course of 
history. Between December 2003 and June 2008, for example, nominal international 
fuel prices grew more than fourfold, with most of the increase occurring during  
2007 and the first half of 2008 (del Granado–Coady–Gillingham [2012]). 
Under such situations, governments are torn between the decision to either ful-
ly pass these sharp deviations on to domestic consumers or absorb them through 
subsidies or savings. Subsidies come with huge costs to the fiscal budget whereas 
savings deny domestic consumers the needed relief through price reductions  
(del Granado–Coady–Gillingham [2012]). Changes in oil prices are the result of a 
combination of factors. Aside from the crude oil price itself, the US dollar exchange 
rate is also considered a very important factor (Zhang et al. [2008]). Hence, several 
studies have tried to determine how retail prices of premium gasoline, diesel, or pet-
rol adjust to increases or decreases in World crude oil prices and the exchange rate 
effect. These studies have reached mixed conclusions. However, the perception is 
that oil marketing companies adjust retail fuel prices upwards faster than they adjust 
them downwards and some authors have found the difference to be statistically  
significant. 
After experimenting with fuel subsidies, most countries have started liberal-
ising their sectors, making the role of the US dollar exchange rate variable more 
pronounced. The liberalisation agenda is always a politically sensitive issue to 
implement in developing countries. This is because the populace does not trust the 
government to use savings from lower oil prices (if the country is a net importer of 
crude oil) or budget savings from higher oil prices (if the country is a net exporter 
of crude oil) to their benefit. 
Most studies have focused on countries that have deregulated their petroleum 
sub-sector to allow oil marketing companies (OMCs) to set their own prices without 
government interference. They mostly test asymmetry between the retail and the 
international crude oil prices, eliminating the exchange rate effect in this regard. 
However, asymmetry can also be tested in situations where governments play a ma-
jor role in setting retail prices of petroleum products and also based on the movement 
of the US dollar exchange rate. 
The present study resolves this problem by using a non-linear autoregressive dis-
tributed lag (NARDL) model which in this case measures the effect of positive and 
negative changes in the exchange rate and international Brent crude oil prices on  
the ex-pump price of premium gasoline in Ghana, Kenya and Colombia. The rest of the 
study is structured into five sections. Section 1 provides a review of the relevant litera-
ture, a description of the study area is introduced in Section 2, Section 3 delves into the 
data and the methodology used for this research, the results and analysis are presented 
in Section 4 and conclusions and recommendations are proposed in Section 5.  
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1. Literature review 
Changes in oil prices are the result of a confluence of many factors. In interna-
tional crude oil trading, the US dollar is mainly used as the invoicing currency. 
Therefore, fluctuations in the US dollar exchange rate are believed to underline vola-
tilities of crude oil prices around the World. Its relative depreciation played a key 
role, for example, in soaring oil prices between 2002 and 2007 (Zhang et al. [2008]).  
Among many sources of real disturbances, such as oil prices, fiscal policy, and 
productivity shocks, real exchange rate movements can be mainly explained by oil 
price changes. Exchange rate fluctuations can be attributed primarily to non-
monetary shocks. Clarida–Gali [1994] and Lastrapes [1992] found that real shocks 
can account for more than 50% of the variance of real exchange rate changes over all 
time horizons (Chen–Chen [2007]). 
1.1. Effect of exchange rate shocks on oil prices 
Using monthly panel data of G7 countries, Chen–Chen [2007] suggested that 
real oil prices may have been a dominant source of real exchange rate movements 
and that there is a link between real oil prices and real exchange rates. They used 
different measures of oil prices, UAE (United Arab Emirates) price of oil (Dubai), 
British price of oil (Brent), and the US West Texas Intermediate price of oil com-
pared to other studies that have used only one. 
On the other hand, Backus–Crucini [2000] found that oil accounts for much of 
the variations in the terms of trade over the last 25 years and its qualitative role varies 
significantly over time. The results of their dynamic general equilibrium model sug-
gested that the economy responds differently to oil supply shocks than to other shocks. 
Crude oil exporting countries may lose from a weak US dollar while benefiting 
from a strong US dollar. Hence, when the prospects of the US dollar are not consid-
ered promising, a large amount of money will flow to the oil market, driving up oil 
prices (Zhang et al. [2008]). A depreciation of the US dollar reduces oil price to 
foreigners relative to the price of their commodities in foreign currencies and thus 
escalating their purchasing power and oil demand, consequently pushing up  
the US dollar price of crude oil (Uddin et al. [2013]). 
Golub [1983] and Krugman [1983] note the role of oil prices in explaining ex-
change rate movements. Basically, a country exporting oil may face exchange rate 
appreciation when oil prices rise and depreciation when oil prices fall, whereas the 
case is the opposite for an oil-importing country. Oil is a homogenous and interna-
tionally traded commodity priced in US dollars. 
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1.2. Effect of crude oil prices on retail prices of gasoline 
Most studies have sought to determine how retail prices of gasoline, diesel,  
or petrol adjust to increases or decreases in World crude oil prices. In testing the 
hypothesis put forward in the Monopolies and Mergers Commission’s reports [1965], 
[1979], [1990] that the speed of adjustment of UK retail gasoline prices to cost 
changes is more rapid when costs rise than when they fall, Bacon [1991] found  
no evidence of faster and more concentrated response to cost increases between  
1982 to 1989. Reilly–Witt [1998] extended the dataset to 1995 using monthly data 
and confirmed the conclusions of Bacon [1991]. They claim that the asymmetry 
response by petrol retailers to crude oil price rises and falls is rejected by data over 
the period examined, and the same occurs for the exchange rate variable. Bettendorf–
van der Geest–Varkevisser [2003] also studied asymmetry in the Dutch consumer 
petrol market and like Bacon [1991], found that the effect of asymmetry on  
the Dutch consumer costs is negligible. 
Liu–Margariti–Tourani-Rad [2010] drew a different conclusion when they 
studied the New Zealand market. Using an asymmetric error correction model 
(ECM), they examined how pre-tax petrol and diesel prices respond to changes  
in crude oil prices. They revealed that oil companies adjusted diesel prices upwards 
faster than they adjusted them downwards and the difference was statistically signifi-
cant. However, the authors also determined a significant relationship for petrol sug-
gesting that diesel prices may not be as competitive, backing the call for government 
actions and monitoring. 
1.3. Dealing with irregularities in the retail sector  
of premium gasoline 
Households are generally against domestic fuel price increases. This is because 
such increases generally (directly or indirectly) lead to higher prices for fuels con-
sumed for cooking, heating, lighting, and private transport with final consequences 
on the cost of production and consumer prices. However, the degree of impact is 
dependent on the explanatory power of these factors across different income groups 
(del Granado–Coady–Gillingham [2012]). 
Recent volatility in international fuel prices has highlighted the fiscal risk in-
herent in the current approach to fuel pricing in many developing and emerging 
countries (Coady et al. [2013]). In most of these countries, domestic fuel prices are 
administratively determined and increases in international fuel prices are often not 
fully passed through to domestic consumers. This has often been in the form of  
unpaid subsidies leading to huge fiscal costs over long periods. These and other  
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factors have increased the call for developing countries to implement a pricing for-
mula that will ensure pass-through over the medium term and avoid sharp increases 
and decreases in domestic prices (Coady et al. [2013], Coady et al. [2017]). 
The foregoing solution is always a politically sensitive issue to implement in 
developing countries. This is because there is a lack of trust in the government to use 
savings from lower oil prices (if the country is a net importer of crude oil) or  
budget savings from higher oil prices (if the country is a net exporter of crude oil)  
for the benefit of the populace. Furthermore, high income groups arguably benefit 
the most from fuel subsidies and consequently poverty among lower income groups 
increases. Unless reform policies are able to deal with these problems in developing 
economies, subsidy reforms are less likely to succeed (del Granado–Coady–
Gillingham [2012]). The problem is also compounded by the irregular nature of retail 
fuel prices in developing countries due mainly to the political aspect. Prices are not 
often adjusted downwards when there is a significant appreciation and/or a reduction 
in international crude oil prices. However, any slight depreciation and/or an increase 
in international crude oil prices is sufficient justification for the government and its 
agents to increase domestic retail fuel prices (Kojima [2009]). 
It is clear from the cited literature that the level of fuel price asymmetry is 
market specific. It is heavily dependent on effective monitoring and implementation 
of a good pricing mechanism. In countries that have this in place, retail prices of 
petrol or gasoline adjust to price increases or decreases at the same rate. Most studies 
have focused on countries that have deregulated their petroleum sub-sector to allow 
OMCs to set their own prices devoid of government interference. They mostly test 
asymmetry between the retail fuel prices and the international crude oil prices, elimi-
nating the exchange rate effect in this regard. However, asymmetry can also be tested 
in situations where governments play a major role in setting retail prices of petrole-
um products and also based on the movement of the US dollar exchange rate.  
This can test whether petroleum prices adjust more quickly to cost increases than to 
cost decreases. The current study examines the case of Ghana, Kenya, and Colombia, 
taking into consideration the fact that Ghana and Kenya import more crude oil than 
they export. 
2. Study area 
The study focuses on Ghana and Kenya with a similar study on Colombia to 
serve as a control experiment. The former two countries are all lower middle-income 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. As mentioned previously, both import more crude 
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oil than they export, especially in terms of their share of crude oil receipts. As a re-
sult, these countries are expected to benefit/lose significantly when the price of crude 
oil falls/increases. On the other hand, Colombia is a middle-income country but also 
an oil producer with similar regulatory problems to Ghana and Kenya. The policy 
situations in the study countries in terms of how they have managed the retail crude 
oil/gasoline sub-sector are discussed below.    
The governments of Kenya and Ghana, and to some extent Colombia, used  
to set the wholesale and retail prices of fuel with the main objective of ensuring low 
consumer pricing (subsidies). The tariff structure adopted by these countries aimed at 
the maximisation of government revenue and the subsidisation of kerosene.  
The argument was that low-income consumers had to be protected but the implemen-
tation of this tariff structure proved to be ineffective as it had no effect on the in-
comes of poor households. For these households, low incomes meant that there was 
no motivation to use more efficient fuels. 
Between 1994 and 2005, Kenya deregulated its petroleum sub-sector.  
Oil marketers had the authority to import oil in crude or refined form. They adopted 
a pricing system that allowed them to set their own margins and consumer prices. 
The market was open to competition, which saw the entry of many small players but 
the government could not effectively monitor and control their operations on the 
ground due to lack of efficient licensing systems. As a result, there were increased 
cases of dumping, tax evasion, product adulteration, and substandard retail outlets. In 
a bid to manage this situation, the Kenyan Government introduced price regulation in 
the petroleum sector through the enactment of laws to tighten its control of the sector 
in 2006 (Mutero [2017]). 
Prior to 2015, Ghana had also attempted to implement an automatic adjustment 
formula – to help deregulate the pricing of fuel or gasoline. However, this was not 
successful, mainly due to lack of political will to ensure pass-through when there 
were increases in the Brent crude oil prices. At the same time, the Government of 
Ghana signed a memorandum of understanding with OMCs and other distributors  
to import finished petroleum products through competitive tendering to supplement 
supply from the country’s refinery (Tema Oil Refinery). The price at which these 
bulk distribution companies (BDCs) supplied the economy with fuel was mostly 
different from the price at which the Government or the National Petroleum Authori-
ty (NPA) directed them to sell to the market. This led to price under- and over-
recoveries – an under-recovery means that fuel consumers are paying too little for 
the product, whilst in an over-recovery situation, consumers are paying too much  
for that. Thus, the NPA set prices that were lower than the supply contract price as 
per the NPA’s supply contract formula. With under-recoveries, the government were 
indebted to the BDCs and vice versa if there were over-recoveries (IMF [2015]). 
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An attempt by the Ghanaian Government to manage its Forex reserve also led 
to a new form of under-recovery known as foreign exchange (FX) loss under-
recovery. This occurs when the FX rate used by the NPA or government in determin-
ing the ex-refinery price of retail fuel or gasoline is lower than the FX rate at which 
the NPA or government provides US dollars to the BDCs through the Bank of Ghana 
to pay for the imported or procured products. These and many factors brought about 
a huge debt in the sector that banks held as non-performing loans on their books. 
During these periods, compared to Kenya and Colombia, Ghana’s ex-pump price of 
gasoline was the lowest. This was mainly due to low taxes and higher ex-refinery 
prices when Brent crude oil prices were falling in 2014 (see the figure and the  
Appendix). 
With a sharp fall in crude oil prices in 2014, Ghana seized an opportunity  
to deregulate the oil sub-sector, which paved the way for a successful implementa-
tion of the automatic adjustment formula. The Ghanaian Government argued that  
the deregulation would free scarce FX resources and government revenue for other 
development projects. In other words, the deregulation of the petroleum downstream 
sector has meant removing the government from the control and regulation of petro-
leum downstream business. 
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In Colombia, gasoline and diesel have been explicitly or implicitly subsidised 
since 1983. Starting in 1998, the government had tried unsuccessfully to eliminate 
the fuel subsidy. In 2003, the government again attempted to gradually remove the 
subsidy. It based its decision on the fact that the subsidy was highly regressive and 
costly for the state. However, subsidies still exist, albeit at a lower level, and the last 
steps to eliminate them are proving difficult. Public opinion holds a very dim view  
of increases in fuel prices. Colombians do not understand why, despite its status as 
an oil producer and exporter, the country has the highest gasoline prices in Latin 
America behind Uruguay, Brazil, and Chile. Their obvious points of comparison are 
Venezuela and Ecuador, two countries with extremely low fuel prices and high gov-
ernment subsidies (Romero–Etter [2013]). 
To avoid a re-occurrence of these situations (irregular implementation of sub-
sidies and transparency fuel pricing), new formulas to calculate producer income 
regarding gasoline and diesel were implemented in Colombia in November 2011 and 
November 2012. While these formulas are also based on producers’ opportunity 
costs, the way producers’ income is set has become more transparent compared to 
the past (Romero–Etter [2013]). 
An interesting characteristic of a deregularised petroleum market is that the 
products are similar and the supplier costs structures are alike under a cooperative 
distribution system and with prices and margins set on an industry-wide basis  
(Liu–Margaritis–Tourani-Rad [2010]). 
As noted in the Appendix, taxes and levies make up a significant portion of retail 
fuel prices in Ghana and any changes in government taxes and levies can therefore 
have a significant impact on retail diesel and petrol prices (Liu–Margaritis– 
Tourani-Rad [2010]). Through the deregulation that the country has implemented, the 
Parliament of Ghana continues to determine petroleum taxes and levies by the issuance 
of an Act of Parliament. Rietveld–van Woudenberg [2005] refers to the differences in 
taxes as the reason why fuel prices differ from one country to the other. 
3. Data and methodology 
Data were sourced from the International Monetary Fund’s international finan-
cial statistics, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, and globalpetrolprices.com.  
They track retail prices of motor fuel, electricity, and natural gas in over 150 coun-
tries. Each data point is cross-checked using multiple sources and without automa-
tion. For instance, the ex-pump price of fuel in Ghana was determined using data 
from the NPA and OMCs (total and allied); the NPA has stopped providing data on 
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monthly fuel prices since the sector was deregulated in 2015. The data used for the 
analysis span from February 2012 to December 2019. Data availability was one of 
the limiting criteria in deciding on the sampled countries.  
Various methods have been used to examine asymmetry in the petroleum sub-
sector. Bacon [1991] proposed a quadratic quantity adjustment model to test this 
hypothesis. Most studies including Reilly–Witt [1998], Bettendorf–van der Geest–
Varkevisser [2003], and Liu et al. [2010], applied the ECM for this purpose.  
Radchenko [2005] used both the partial adjustment model and the vector auto-
regressive model for the construction of the gasoline price impulse response and 
asymmetry measures. Karantininis–Katrakylidis–Persson [2011], Greenwood-
Nimmo–Shin [2013], Atil–Lahiani–Nguyen [2014], Alsamara et. al. [2017],  
and Kisswani [2019] among others, have recently adopted the NARDL model  
to measure price asymmetry especially in the oil sub-sector. The popularity of this 
model is based on the fact that it is one of the simplest forms of non-linear ECMs 
(Greenwood-Nimmo–Shin [2013]). 
Before the adoption of the NARDL model, its predecessor, the autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) model was also popularly used. The ARDL model  
like the one specified in Equation /1/, assumes a linear combination of ty  and tx , 
which indicates a symmetric adjustment in the long and the short run  
(Alsamara et al. [2017]). 
                   
1 1




t t t t i t i t t
i i
y α ρy θx r α y δ x μ
 
   
 
       w   /1/ 
where α is the intercept, while ρ, θ, r, α and δ are coefficients associated with a linear 
trend. p and q are the lag variables of the dependent and explanatory variables,  
respectively. tw  is a vector of deterministic variables and tμ  is an iid (independent 
and identically distributed) stochastic process. The two variables ty  and tx  in  
Equation /1/ are not cointegrated if 0.ρ θ    
The relationship between these variables can also be non-linear, which makes 
the use of a linear model misleading. The ECM and NARDL models were proposed 
to deal with this problem. Since the ARDL is a cointegrated model, it was thus sug-
gested that an ECM provides a more appropriate specification for testing asymmetric 
price transmission. Proponents of these models make tests for cointegration and the 
existence of a cointegrated relationship a must because if there is no cointegration, 
then there is no price transmission, which means there cannot be any asymmetric 
price transmission either, and the results will have no economic meaning since the 
two prices have no relationship (Karantininis–Katrakylidis–Persson [2011]).  
This strict application of the ARDL model has been relaxed by recent studies.  
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The reason was that a long-run relationship between two series will prevent them 
from drifting apart. This implies that the test for asymmetry can only be prudent in 
the short run with respect to the speed of adjustment. Analysis of the magnitude of 
the asymmetry is not possible. This is because such asymmetry suggests that there is 
a permanent divergence between positive and negative price changes, which  
in the long run means that the series cannot be cointegrated. Another disadvantage is 
that if there is asymmetry in the series, this may confuse the standard tests such as 
the Dickey-Fuller unit root test and the Johansen test for cointegration (Karantininis–
Katrakylidis–Persson [2011]). 
Due to these shortfalls in some of the models illustrated above, this study 
adopts the NARDL model used by Alsamara et al. [2017] because it can be applied 
irrespective of the order of integration of the regressors. This allows for statistical 
inferences on long-run estimates, which are not possible under alternative cointegra-
tion techniques. Based on the ARDL model in Equation /1/, the NARDL model is 
developed by first breaking the tx  variable into negative and positive partial sums  
as shown in Equation /2/: 
                                                       0t t tx x x x







x x max x 
 
    and  
1 1
Δ Δ ,0 .
t t
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 
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The non-linear asymmetric cointegration regression can be expressed as 
                                                  t t t ty β x β x μ
        /3/ 
where β  is the long-run coefficient associated with the positive change in tx  and 
β  is the long-run coefficient associated with the negative change in .tx  Shin–Yu–
Greenwood-Nimmo [2014] revealed that by substituting Equation /3/ in the  
ARDL (p, q) model presented in Equation /1/, we obtain the following non-linear 
asymmetric conditional ARDL: 
 
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Equation /4/ is estimated using the standard ordinary least squares, checking 
for cointegration between the levels of the series, and testing the long- and short-run 
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symmetry using the Wald test. The equation is used to derive dynamic multipliers 
hm
  and hm
  associated with changes in tx
  and .tx
   
The dependent variable is the change in the natural log of the ex-pump price of 
premium gasoline (DLNGAS). The independent variables are the natural log of Brent 
crude oil prices (LN_BRENT), the benchmark used by Europe and the rest of the 
World, and the exchange market pressure (EMP) index. The EMP index used in this 
study is similar to that introduced by Girton–Roper [1977]. Before settling on this, 
different versions of the index were estimated and the one with the simple average of 
exchange rate changes and a foreign reserve depletion indicator to capture the reac-
tion function of policy authorities was identified as the most responsive (EMP_2). 
The Eviews software was used for the estimation and also to automatically select the 
appropriate lags for the dependent and explanatory variables.  
4. Results and analysis 
The NARDL model presented in Table 1 breaks the independent variables into 
two parts. Thus, measuring both the positive and negative changes in Brent crude oil 
prices and the EMP index, the following is sought to be investigated: Whether the 
effect of increasing Brent crude oil prices is the same as that of decreasing Brent 
crude oil prices, and whether the effect of the increasing EMP index is the same as 
that of the decreasing EMP index. According to Table 1, in the short run, the previ-
ous second, fifth and ninth months all had a significant negative effect on fluctua-
tions in the ex-pump price of premium gasoline in Ghana. In Kenya, changes in ex-
pump premium gasoline prices had a significant negative relationship with previous 
ex-pump gasoline prices. This conclusion is not different from the control experi-
ment that uses Colombia as the study country. 
Increases in the Brent crude oil prices did not have any significant impact on 
the changes in the ex-pump price of premium gasoline in Ghana over the study peri-
od. However, in Kenya and Colombia, the third and sixth lags were positively and 
significantly correlated with the ex-pump price changes, respectively. The signifi-
cance level was 10% for Kenya and 5% for Colombia. There was a strong associa-
tion between the first lag of negative changes in the Brent crude oil prices and the 
changes in the ex-pump price of premium gasoline in Kenya. This is similar to the 
case in Colombia where a significant relationship between the third lag of the nega-
tive changes in Brent crude oil prices and the changes in the ex-pump price of pre-
mium gasoline was found, too. This was also true for the seventh, eighth and ninth 
lags in the case of Ghana. 
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Table 1  
NARDL model for the changes in the log of premium gasoline prices 
Variable 
Ghana Kenya Colombia 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
DLNGAS(–1) –0.162 –1.400       –0.343 –2.919*     –0.250 –4.241*     
DLNGAS(–2) –0.306 –2.522**   –0.423 –3.708*     –0.129 –3.400*     
DLNGAS(–3) –0.123 –0.955       –0.191 –1.775*** 
DLNGAS(–4) –0.074 –0.582       –0.373 –3.465*     
DLNGAS(–5) –0.280 –2.290**   
DLNGAS(–6) 0.070 0.640       
DLNGAS(–7) –0.058 –0.563       
DLNGAS(–8) –0.102 –1.097       
DLNGAS(–9) –0.190 –2.109**   
LN_BRENT_POS 0.090 0.500       0.077 0.885       0.008 0.201       
LN_BRENT_POS(–1) 0.117 0.539       –0.054 –0.472       0.017 0.333       
LN_BRENT_POS(–2) 0.154 0.682       0.109 1.003       0.030 0.587       
LN_BRENT_POS(–3) –0.272 –1.146       –0.144 –1.828*** –0.062 –1.358       
LN_BRENT_POS(–4) –0.371 –1.637       –0.028 –0.617       
LN_BRENT_POS(–5) 0.290 1.296       0.064 1.414       
LN_BRENT_POS(–6) 0.261 1.090       –0.074 –2.352**   
LN_BRENT_POS(–7) –0.293 –1.555       
LN_BRENT_NEG 0.004 0.034       –0.013 –0.213       0.011 0.350       
LN_BRENT_NEG(–1) 0.127 0.649       0.280 2.974*     0.077 1.816*** 
LN_BRENT_NEG(–2) –0.086 –0.442       –0.037 –0.380       0.024 0.575       
LN_BRENT_NEG(–3) 0.230 1.154       0.052 0.535       –0.074 –2.491**   
LN_BRENT_NEG(–4) –0.023 –0.110       –0.134 –1.586       
LN_BRENT_NEG(–5) –0.211 –1.063       –0.074 –0.911       
LN_BRENT_NEG(–6) –0.165 –0.843       –0.085 –1.050       
LN_BRENT_NEG(–7) 0.478 2.332**   –0.061 –0.739       
LN_BRENT_NEG(–8) –0.493 –2.616**   –0.028 –0.332       
LN_BRENT_NEG(–9) 0.237 1.885*** 0.084 1.634       
EMP_2_POS –0.489 –2.344**   –0.252 –1.667       –1.044 –19.755*     
EMP_2_POS(–1) –0.003 –0.011       0.055 0.314       
EMP_2_POS(–2) –0.453 –1.720*** –0.020 –0.121       
EMP_2_POS(–3) 0.764 3.003*     0.303 1.818*** 
EMP_2_POS(–4) –0.520 –2.399**   –0.331 –1.998*** 
EMP_2_POS(–5) –0.001 –0.004       
EMP_2_POS(–6) –0.257 –1.554       
EMP_2_POS(–7) 0.315 1.765*** 
EMP_2_POS(–8) 0.394 2.324**   
EMP_2_POS(–9) –0.343 –2.368**   
EMP_2_NEG –0.494 –4.472*     –0.147 –1.089       –0.912 –15.617*     
EMP_2_NEG(–1) 0.181 0.790       –0.253 –3.011*     
EMP_2_NEG(–2) –0.072 –0.279       
EMP_2_NEG(–3) –0.815 –3.206*     
EMP_2_NEG(–4) 0.811 3.179*     
EMP_2_NEG(–5) –0.641 –2.913*     
EMP_2_NEG(–6) 0.208 1.927*** 
α 0.032 1.882*** 0.008 0.519      0.026 6.933*     
R2 0.775 0.745 0.945 
Adjusted R2 0.581 0.611 0.933 
Durbin–Watson statistic 1.917   2.116   2.156   
*** p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.01.  
Note. The appropriate lags for the dependent and explanatory variables were selected based on the in-
formation criteria, by using the Eviews software. 
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Both positive and negative lag movements of the EMP index had mostly signifi-
cant impacts on fluctuations in the ex-pump price of premium gasoline for Ghana,  
Kenya, and Colombia. This highlights the importance of the exchange rate and the poli-
cy response in terms of retail gasoline prices in these three countries in the short run. 
The long-run form of the estimated NARDL model (see Table 2) largely con-
firms the findings in the short-run form in Table 1. The results indicate that, except 
for Colombia, there was no significant relationship between positive/negative chang-
es in Brent crude oil prices and fluctuations in the ex-pump price of premium gaso-
line over the study period. For Colombia, a unit increase in Brent crude oil prices led 
to a 0.033 fall in the ex-pump price of premium gasoline. In addition, a unit decrease 
in Brent crude oil prices resulted in a 0.028 fall in the ex-pump price of premium 
gasoline (because we are dealing with negative changes). This is expected as fuel 
prices in Colombia are still subsidised despite the reforms in 2012. It is further com-
pounded by the fact that its neighbours sell fuel at far lower prices at the pumps 
(Romero–Etter [2013]). 
Also in the long run, there were significant relationships between the posi-
tive/negative movements in the exchange rate (EMP_2) and the ex-pump price of pre-
mium gasoline in Ghana and Colombia, but not in Kenya. In Ghana and Colombia,  
a unit increase in the EMP index (appreciation pressure) brought about a 0.315 and 
0.757 fall in the ex-pump price of gasoline, respectively. On the other hand, a unit fall 
in the EMP index (depreciation pressure) induced a 0.370 and 0.845 increase in the ex-
pump gasoline prices, respectively.  
The long-run results reveal that over the study period the exchange rate was 
very significant in determining the ex-pump price of gasoline in the countries except 
for Kenya. The situation in Kenya was probably due to the fact that the country is 
‘moving back and forth’ in terms of the regulation of the retail fuel sub-sector: price 
regulation prior to 1994, price deregulation from 1994 to 2005, and then back to 
price regulation from 2006 onwards. A Wald test conducted on the positive and neg-
ative changes of the EMP index did not suggest that these effects were significantly 
different from each other for all countries. In Ghana, the study period corresponds 
mostly with the period since the price deregulation in 2015. This may have account-
ed for the significance of the EMP index and for the acceptance of the null hypothe-
sis of the Wald test on the equal effects of positive and negative EMP index move-
ments on the changes in the ex-pump premium gasoline prices. 
The diagnostics tests have accepted the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation 
and no heteroscedasticity between the residuals of the models estimated. Further-
more, the null hypothesis of normality was accepted for all cases except for the mod-
el for Colombia. 
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Table 2  
Long-run form of the NARDL model 
Variable 
Ghana Kenya Colombia 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
LN_BRENT_POS –0.010 –0.485     –0.005 –0.685 –0.033 –3.653* 
LN_BRENT_NEG 0.044 1.193     –0.007 –0.736 0.028 2.599* 
EMP_2_POS –0.315 –2.799*   –0.059 –0.806 –0.757 –14.362* 
EMP_2_NEG –0.370 –3.384*   –0.063 –1.091 –0.845 –17.023* 
C 0.015 2.093** 0.004 0.523 0.019 6.959* 
*** p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.01.  
5. Conclusion 
This study has investigated the problem of price asymmetry in the petroleum 
sub-sector of Ghana, Kenya, and Colombia. This was driven by the fact that the retail 
price of petrol or gasoline is expected to be affected by the World price of Brent 
crude oil and the US dollar exchange rate. In this respect, the literature discussed 
herein confirms the determining effect of these two variables on the ex-pump price 
of petrol or gasoline. How retail prices respond to changes in these important varia-
bles has often been discussed. The general perception is that prices are likely to ad-
just faster upwards than downwards. To measure this phenomenon, the present study 
has adopted a relatively new method, NARDL, which is used to estimate the effect 
of positive and negative changes in various variables on a price variable. This model 
was chosen because it deals with the problem of non-linearity of the pricing variable 
and with both short- and long-run effects of the variables. 
The results have revealed that the positive and negative movements in the  
US dollar exchange rate over the study period, measured by the EMP index, were 
significant in determining fluctuations in the ex-pump price of premium gasoline in 
the short run for Ghana, Kenya, and Colombia and in the long run for Ghana and  
Colombia. The null hypothesis of the equality of these effects was accepted. Increas-
es and decreases in the international Brent crude oil prices all led to falls in the ex-
pump price of petrol or gasoline in Colombia in the long run. This was due to the 
fact that Colombia’s petroleum sub-sector is still regulated by the government even 
though its fuel price is low among its neighbours. Neither international Brent crude 
oil prices nor the EMP index was significant in determining changes in the ex-pump 
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price of petrol or premium gasoline for Kenya in the long run. This was caused by 
the shifts between regulation and deregulation in the country’s petroleum sub-sector 
over the study period. 
The study suggests that the exchange rate is likely to be an important variable in 
determining the ex-pump price of petrol or gasoline once the petroleum sub-sector 
moves towards deregulation, as is evident in the case of Ghana. The policy recommen-
dation in this case would be to allow the exchange rate to freely float but, considering its 
effects, if there is excessive depreciation or appreciation pressure, accumulation of re-
serves is recommended as an immediate solution to prevent exchange rate shocks. 
However, this solution also comes with the opportunity cost of using these reserves for 
the much-needed investments in these countries. The effect of taxes cannot also be ig-
nored once deregulation takes place – this is the case in Ghana. 
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Note. MGN: processing or storage margins of premium gasoline producers.  
Source: NPA and own estimates. 
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